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SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC AND
EXTERNAL FINANCE
Transactions in the Special Account can be
used to meet obligations in the General Account. The scheme was activated on 1st
January 1970 when the first allocations totalling $3·5 billion were made to membercountries. Subsequent issues for 1971 and
1972 were fixed at $3 billion each. Allocations were made onthe basis of, and in
proportion to, the quotas of membercountries. Thus in 1970, Nigeria, with a
quota of $ 100 million, received a total allocations of $16-8 million Special Drawing
Rights.

WHAT SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS ARE

The need to create the new international
monetary asset called Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs) arose largely from the widening gap
between the volume of world trade and the
means of financing it (that is, international
monetary reserves). Such reserves (collectively
comprising international liquidity) constitute
those over which the monetary authorities of
the individual countries have unconditional
and immediate command. They are made up
of monetary gold,1 convertible currencies
(mamly U.S. dollars and £'s sterling) and
members' reserve pos1tions in the InterLIQ'!:IDJTY OF SDRS
national Monetary Fund.' The major funcSpecial Drawing Rights arc 'paper gold',
tions of these reserves are to facilitate trade
transferable among the participating countries
and exchange, and to provide means of
who are committed to accept them in exfinancing the temporary imbalance which
change for convertible currencies (that is,
arises between international payments and
currencies that can be used in international
· receipts. However, since 19GO, the volume
nf world trade has been rising at a faster . payments and exchange). Special Dra~ing
Rights are guaranteed in terms of gold carry) '. rate than international reserves. vVhile world
imports rose at an annual growth rate of 11 ·3 ~ . ng a rate of interest fixed at 1·5 per cent per
per cent from $119·4 billion in 1960 to $254·-1- ~ annum. Any country's acquisition and use of
billion in 1969, total world reserves only rose '{ Special Drawing Rights would have exactly
' the same function, effect, and liquidity as
at an annual growth rate of 2·8 per cent
its acquisition and use of gold and foreign
from $60·2 billi,m in 1960 to $76'9 billion
exchange. Special Drawing Rights therefore
" in 1969. The idea of creating SDRs was
constitute additional gen-uine foreign exconceived to aYert any shortage of interchange reserves since national monetary
national liquidity arising from the widening
authorities stand ready to accept them in
gap between worl<l trade and the means of
settlement of international transactions.
financing it. The Special Drawing Rights
scheme was first adopted by the International
FC:S-CTIONS A:S-D OPERATIONS OF SDRS
Monetary Fund in Rio de Janeiro in September 1966. To accommodate the scheme
Every participating country is entitled to
the I.M.F. Articles of Agreement were
use its S~cial Drawing Rights to acquire an
amended and approved by the Board of
equivalent amount of convertible currencies
Governors, in resolution No. 23-5 adopted
unconditionally for balance of payments
on 31st May, 1968. Two separate accounts
lor reserve needs. A country can be in balance
were created under the amendment
of payments surplus and still use Special
(a) a General Account for the existing J-' Drawing Rights: if it is redeeming liabiiities
I.M.F. operations;
.S. at a more rapid rate than the rate of increase
(b) a Special Account for Special Drawing
of its surplus on all transactions, it can use
Rights.
a combination of its "reserves" and Special

1

1

•

A distinction is usually made between gold held by a monetary authority (e.g., a central bank) and that
held by private individuals. The former is "monetary gold" wkile the latter is "non-monetary gold".
Gold can however move from a private individual to a monetary authority through purchase and vice
versa.
This comprises both the unconditional and conditional positions in the I.M.F. The unconditional
position is the "gold tranche" position of a country, that is, its gold subSGription to the I.M.F. Nigeria's
gold tranche position is currently $11 ·3 million.
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allocations of Special Drawing Rights to meet
balance of payments needs. That is, such
use of Special Drawing Rights should not
exceed 70 per cent of the country's average
cumulative net allocations. In e!Tect, a participant would not be expected, on a daily
average basis, to hold Special Drawing Rights
of less than 30 per cent of the average of its
net cumulative allocations over a specified
period of five years. If a participant .should
use more than 70 per cent of its SDRs during
this period it would be expected to restore its
minimum position to 30 per cent of holdings
of SDRs (i.e., to buy back Special Drawing
Rights in order not to exceed the maximum
use of 70 per cent). This procedure, whereby
a participant acquires Special Drawings
Rights to meet its required minimum holdings
is referred to in the Fund's technical parlance
as "reconstitution". It~ purpose is to prevent
a country from financing persistent· deficits
on reserve losses by the exclusive use of Special
Drawing Rights.

Drawing Rights to meet the difference. On the
other hand, a country cannot use its Special
, Drawing Rights when its total holdings of
gold, foreign exchange and its reserve position
in the Fund are increasing; or would increase
thereby. Participating countries cannot use
Special Drawing Rights merely to change the
composition of their reserve assets. The outline of the plan for Special Drawing Rights
states that except under the guidance of the
I.M.F. "a participant will be expected to use
its Special Drawin!J, Rights only for balance of
payme~s or in the light oraevelopments m its total reserves and not for the solt'
purpose of changing the composition of its
reserves". This proviso is designed to ensurt'
that participating countries use other reserve
assets as well as Special Drawing Rights to
meet their obligations. Otherwise, participants could, for example, use their Special
Drawing Rights to afquire dollars on sterling
and then use these to acquire gold, which in
certain circumstances may appear more attractive than other reserve assets. For this
reason participants in Special Drawing Rights
must maintain, over time, a balanced relationship between their holdings of Special Drawing Rights on the one hand, and their
holdings of gold, convertible currencies and
reserve position in the Fund, on the other.

I

The net holdings of the participants'
Special Drawing Rights are to he determined
over each calendar quarter after the first
five years following t~e initial allocation.
However, two years after the first allocation,
i.e. January 1972, the Fund will make
monthly calculations to determine if the
monthly ratios of participants' net holdings
of Special Drawing Rights wol!ld enable
them to fulfil the requirement to hold not
less than 30 per cent of the average of their
daily net cumulative holdings over the period
of the first five years. A participant will be
notified by the Fund when its holdings of
Special Drawing Rights are found to be less
than 30 per cent of its average daily net
cumulative allocation over the basic period,
and it will he .the participant's responsibility
to acquire Special Drawing Rights to meet
the requirements for average minimum
holdings. A country can use its entire allocation, hut it must either spend a smaller
proportion of the subsequent year's allocation or buy back Special Drawing Rights
from other countries so as to keep its average
use down to 70 per cent. For example, Nigeria,
which received $16-8 million Special Drawing
Rights in January 1970, may receive $14.1
million for 1971 and 1972, respectively, on
the basis of the existing quota of , 100 million,
could make use of all its SDRs but would
later have to reconstitute or reacquire $13.5
million within five years.'

A I?articipant with a need to use Special
Drawmg Rights as defined by the Articles
of Agreement has the right to transfer them
to participants designated by the Fund as
transfrrees. The Fund would then make
arrangements for the exchange of such SDRs
into needed currencies convertible in fact.

Special Drawing Rights may also be exchanged for convertible currencies in bilateral transactions. For example, particip·a~
A may enter negotiations with participant
to exchange A's Special Drawing Rights for
B's currency:-fn such a case both parties
to the agreement are required to inform the
Fund of the details of the transaction which
they are entering into and at the- same time
indicate the leizal authority for the transat;tion. Special Drawing Rights can also be
us~d to meet rep~hase and other obligations
in the Fund.
1

THE 'RECONSTITUTJON" PROVISION

Over a five-year periqd, a country can ~
up to 70 per cent of its net cumulative
1

E.fff!clj~ 30th October, 1970, new quota increa9ea were made to member countries of the Fund which
may affect SDRs allocations in 1971 and 1972.
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Thus, designated participants in the scheme
are obliged to accept Special Drawing Rights
in exchange for other designated currencies.
When a country's holdings of Special Drawing Rights total three times its original
allocation, it is entitled to refuse any additional accumulation.

Assets
Holdings of SDRs
(decline by 50)

I.iabilities

50
100

Foreign ex<·hange (x + 50)
x+l00

x+ 100

(c) Settlement of net charges and assets

=10
l:",TER:-;.\L ACCOU!\:TING FOR THE SDRS

A participant must use Special Drawing
Rights to settle net charges or assessnwnts
levied at the end of the Fund's financial
vear. A participant can also use Special
Drawing Rights to pay charges to the Fund
in connection with the transactions on the
General Account. Pavment of charges in1plies a net use of SDRs which ma~: cause
the average holdings to fall below the net
cumulative allocation. Profit and loss (expense account) is debited and holdings of
SDRs credited, Thus-

The I.M.F. prepared an illustrative system
of accounting, showing the following features
which each country can adapt to local conditions.' There are four processes involved : (a) Initial allocation of 100

SDRs should

be recorded thus-

I

Dr.
Holdings of Special Drawing
Rights ... ... ... ... ...
Allocations of Special
Drawing Rights ...

Cr.

100
100

That is, holdings appear on the assets side
and allocations on the liabilities side.'. This
procedure was suggested to make Special
Drawing Rights accounting correspond with
the Fund's own account title. Thus, when the
Central Bank in its balance sheet shows the
asset item, '·Holdings of SDRs", to record
allocations, the debit entry will correspond
to a credit entry in the Special Drawing
account, "Huldings of SDRs by participants"
and the credit entrv in the Central Bank's
li<'.oks to the account, "Allocations of SDRs",
will .correspt>1:d to the debit entry in the
Special Draw111g account, "Net Cumulative
.\llocations of Special Drawing Rights to
Participants."

Assets
Holdings of SDRs 40
(decline by 10)
Profit and loss

Liabilities

x=l0

(d) Repurchase of participant's currency
from I.M.F. General Account= 10
A participant can transfer SDRs to the
general account in settlelllent of repur~hase
obligations as shown below
Dr.
Other liabilities
(I.M.F. deposit account)
Holdings of Special
Drawing Rights

Cr.'

10
10

E'XTERNAL FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SDRS

It is also suggested that the asset item "Holdings of SDRs", should be included in the
~ategory, "Gold, foreign currencies, etc.",
111 the balance sheet because of the reserve
charac!e~istics of . this asset. for all participants,. 1t 1s recogmsed that the Special Drawmg Rights ~re international assets as good as
gold or foreign exchange, though not tangible
or physical.

Earlier, mention was made of the liquidity
of the Special Drawing Rights. Also, as shown
earlier, the participant in the Special Drawing Rights is the country concerned, and the
SDRs are albcated to the government of
the country through its fiscal agent. In
Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Finance
acts as fiscal agent to the I.M.F. on behalf of
the Federal Government under Article V,
section 1 of the Fund's Articles of Agreement.
However, by domestic arrangement, the
Central Bank of Nigeria llleets the
Governlllent's obligations to the Fund,
thus assu111ing full responsibility for rights
and obligations to the 1.M.F. One can

. (b) Use of SDRs: If a participant uses
its SDRs, ~ay 50, to acquire foreign exchange,
the result 1s an increase in one asset (foreign
exchange) and a decrease in another asset
(SDRs) so that the liabilities side remaim
unchan~ed.
1

See I.M.F. "Accounting for Special Drawing Righls·', SM/69/147, September 26, 1969.
The accounting system here is based on balance of payments accounting where an increase in assets
is debited a,:d an increase in liabilities is credited.
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assume that this arrangement will be extended to the SDRs. The Central Bank, as
the holder of the country's gold and foreign
exchange, will thus be enabled to carry
Special Drawing Rights so acquired as part
of its a,sets. As shown earlier, Special Drawing Rights can be used to obtain foreign
currencv to meet balance of payments needs.
Once t~tal SDRs allocated to Nigeria have
been added to total reserves, the use of
holdings of Special Drawing Rights by the
Central Bank to acquire foreign currency
will only change the distribution of the
Bank's foreign assets among different types
of assets, without changing the total.' If the
Central Bank should sell foreign exchange
to domestic users in exchange for domestic
currency, and the deficit in the balance of
payments should persist, the instantaneous
reduction in foreign assets and the attendant
balance of payments deficit would be brought
about by the use of a combination of the
various forms of foreign assets - - - gold,
foreign exchange and Special Drawing Rights.
If the reduction in net foreign assets should
also lead to a reduction in money supply, it
would also be because of the use of various
forms of foreign assets.

DOMESTIC Fl);A.'.'.CI,\L IMPLIC,\TIO);S OF SfJRS

1
J

Similarly, the increase in Special Drawing\
Rights against a corresponding reduction in·
the Central Bank"s holdings of foreign exchange would only result in a redistribution \
of foreign assets and no't in a change in the
aggregate. If a country's balance of pavments is in equilibrium and there should be
an increase in holdings of Special Drawing
Rights, the result would be an overall balance
of payments surplus, which could, depending
upon policy decision, lead to an increase in
numey supply.
The totality of the argument points to the
liquidity of Special Drawing Rights and to
the fact that they are as good for currency
cover requirements as gold and foreign exchange. Thus, the inclusion of Special Draw} ing Rights in the currency cover requirement
would enable the Central Bank to increase
its capacity to create currency when the
volume of Special Drawing Rights increases.
either by direct allocation or by way of
balance of payments surplus.
1

Depending on policy decision, dornestic
monetary expansion can also result fro111
an increase in the volume of Special Drawing Rights acquired either by dir<>ct allocation or by way of balance of pay11w11b
surplus. The reverse would he true if holding,
of Special Drawing Rights decrease. As ~hown
earlier, while allocation of Special Drawing
Rights is made to the countrv through it>
fiscal agent, the transfer of SDRs by the
Federal Government to the Central Bank
poses a different question. As the Central
Bank would then hold the international
asset, the Federal Government might insist
on an equal amount of local currency. The
effect would b~~ry__()L!!l_cJ~.;upply
if the Government should decide to spend
the local currencv. In order to avoid such a
situation, the I.M.F. has made a suggestion
that the Government could hold· a special
deposit in a blocked account with the Central
Bank in local currency equal in value to the
country's net cumulative allocation, so that
the money supply effet::t would be neutral.
If the country should finally withdraw fro111
participation in Special Drawing Rights, or
;f the allocations should be recalled, the
blocked account could then be used to acquire the Special Drawing Rights without
affecting money supply.'
SUMMARY

The Special Drawing Rights have been
presented here as a new, additional instrument of international means of payment.
They perform the same function as gold and
foreign exchange which constitute the foreign
exchange reserves of a country and therefore
are as liquid as those assets. The Special
Drawing Rights are also as good as gold and
foreign exchange for the purpose of local
currency cover. They can be used to acquire
an equivalent amount of convertible curren}cies from other participants in the Fund in
order to meet balance of payments or reserve
needs. They can also be used to meet other
repurchase obligations in the Fund, including
interest charges. For all these purposes, a
country can, on the average, use 70 per cent
of all holdings of Special Drawing Rights
over a period of five years.

See the section, "Internal Accounting for the SDRs", supra.
See I.M.F., "Certain Domestic Finanrial Aspects of Special Drawing Rights", SM/68/131, July 31, 1968
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